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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant, Mark Z. Greenberg ("Greenberg"), appeals an 
order of the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, 
United States of America ("United States"), on Greenberg's claim 
for a partial refund of an amount Greenberg paid on an Internal 
Revenue Service ("IRS") penalty assessment, and on the United 
States' counterclaim to reduce the balance of the assessment to 
judgment.  In doing so, the district court upheld IRS's 
assessment of a 100% "penalty" against Greenberg under section 
6672 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the "Code"), 26 
U.S.C.A. § 6672 (West Supp. 1994), after finding that Greenberg 
was a "responsible person" who had "willfully" failed to pay over 
to IRS federal employment taxes owed by his employer, Turning 
Basin, Inc. ("Turning Basin" or the "Company").  We will affirm. 
 
  
 I.  Factual & Procedural History 
 Turning Basin was a holding company which acquired 
other companies through leveraged buyouts.  Greenberg, a 
certified public accountant since 1973, served initially as an 
outside accountant for Turning Basin while employed by Alan 
Moskowitz & Company.  In late 1979, Greenberg accepted the 
position of in-house controller at Turning Basin.  Soon after 
joining Turning Basin, Greenberg became its treasurer and 
assistant secretary and signed at least one corporate document, a 
loan guarantee, in this capacity.  Greenberg also served as a 
member of Turning Basin's Board of Directors and in 1981 he 
received 40,000 shares of Turning Basin stock.  Throughout 
Greenberg's tenure with Turning Basin, Arthur Tuchinsky 
("Tuchinsky") was Chairman of its Board of Directors, as well as 
its Chief Executive Officer and controlling shareholder. 
 As controller of Turning Basin, Greenberg supervised a 
staff of one accountant and two bookkeepers and was responsible 
for the hiring and firing of employees within his department.  
Although Greenberg acknowledged he exercised this authority, he 
contended that decisions on hiring and firing were ultimately 
determined by Tuchinsky.  Greenberg also testified that Tuchinsky 
set the salaries of all of Turning Basin's employees and 
officers. 
 As controller, Greenberg was also responsible for 
preparing financial statements and reports on the Company's 
subsidiaries.  These statements and reports were included in 
quarterly or semi-annual reports to Turning Basin's stockholders.  
  
Greenberg coordinated Turning Basin's annual audits with its 
outside accounting firm and his department was responsible for 
overseeing payment of Turning Basin's creditors and reconciling 
the Company's checking account.  He was an authorized signatory 
on all of Turning Basin's bank accounts and signed checks on all 
of them.  Turning Basin's corporate checkbooks were first kept in 
Greenberg's office and later in the bookkeepers' office.  
Greenberg had access to these checkbooks at all times.  At his 
deposition, Greenberg stated that although he had constant access 
to the Company's checkbooks and was an authorized signatory, he 
only wrote checks when directed to do so by Tuchinsky.  Greenberg 
also testified that he was not authorized to raise cash on behalf 
of the Company or make wire transfers for Turning Basin without 
specific permission from Tuchinsky. 
 Sometime in 1981, Turning Basin began having cash-flow 
problems.  Greenberg then became responsible for reviewing the 
accounts payable with Tuchinsky and assisting Tuchinsky in 
determining which creditors should be paid first.  Once Greenberg 
and Tuchinsky decided who would be paid, Greenberg would sign 
checks to pay them.  Whenever a check was returned for 
insufficient funds, the bank or creditor would contact either 
Greenberg or Tuchinsky in order to resolve the matter.  According 
to Greenberg's deposition testimony, he and Tuchinsky would again 
discuss which current bills were most urgent and Tuchinsky would 
decide who to pay and where to find the money to pay them.  
Greenberg testified that he never refused to pay anyone that 
  
Tuchinsky told him to pay, nor did he ever pay any creditor 
Tuchinsky told him not to pay. 
 Greenberg was also responsible for preparing and filing 
Turning Basin's federal tax returns, including its federal 
employment tax returns on Forms 940 and 941.  By 1981, Turning 
Basin was delinquent in remitting the withholding taxes to IRS.  
Greenberg was aware of the tax delinquency from the time it 
began.  He testified that he discussed the tax delinquencies with 
Tuchinsky and repeatedly recommended that the taxes be paid.  
Greenberg testified that Tuchinsky assured him the taxes would 
get paid, and that Greenberg had believed these assurances.  He 
admitted, however, that on at least one occasion Tuchinsky 
informed him that they must pay more urgent bills right away in 
order to keep the business going and would pay the taxes later. 
 Greenberg therefore continued to write checks to 
Turning Basin's employees and other creditors despite the 
existing withholding tax delinquencies.  Because Tuchinsky was 
responsible for placing money in Turning Basin's checking 
accounts, Greenberg did not write a check to IRS for the 
withholding tax delinquencies because he knew there would be no 
funds in the account to cover the check.  Greenberg also believed 
that if he did issue a check to IRS without Tuchinsky's approval, 
he would have been fired immediately.  He acknowledged that he 
could have authorized wire transfers of cash from the subsidiary 
corporations' accounts to Turning Basin's accounts without 
Tuchinsky's instructions but did not do so because he felt it was 
beyond his authority. 
  
 Eventually, Tuchinsky told Greenberg to write checks to 
cover the withholding tax delinquencies.  Greenberg did so, and 
when the checks were returned for insufficient funds, Greenberg 
confronted Tuchinsky.  When he realized the tax liability would 
not be paid, Greenberg resigned as an officer and director of 
Turning Basin. 
 On February 9, 1987, the IRS entered an assessment 
under 26 U.S.C.A. § 6672(a) against Greenberg for Turning Basin's 
delinquent withholding taxes.  Greenberg paid $4,024.26 toward 
the assessment and on May 13, 1992 filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania seeking a refund.  The United States filed an answer 
on October 6, 1992 along with a counterclaim seeking $14,456.52 
plus interest which it claimed Greenberg still owed under the 
penalty provision. 
 On June 1, 1993, the United States filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which the district court granted on December 3, 
1993.  On February 4, 1994, the court entered an order amending 
the judgment to reflect Greenberg's additional payment of 
$2,335.13, making the balance due $23,881.68.  The balance 
included $11,760.29 in interest which had accrued up to 
December 3, 1993. 
 
  
  II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1340, 1346(a)(1) (West 
1993) and 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401, 7402 (West 1989).  The district 
court had jurisdiction over the United States' counterclaim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(c) (West 1993).  We have 
jurisdiction over the final order of the district court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
 We review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  United States v. Carrigan, 31 F.3d 130, 133 
(3d Cir. 1994).  We consider all of the facts and inferences in 
the light most favorable to Greenberg, the nonmoving party, in 
order to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material 
fact.  If no genuine issue of material fact remains, the moving 
part is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1  Id. 
 
  III.  Analysis 
 Sections 3102 and 3401 of the Code require employers to 
withhold federal social security and income taxes from the wages 
                     
1
.  Greenberg filed his notice of appeal on January 31, 1994 but 
the district court did not enter its order amending the judgment 
to add interest until February 7, 1994.  Once the district court 
acts on a motion to amend the judgment we have jurisdiction over 
the initial judgment or order identified in the notice of appeal, 
but a party seeking review of a motion that was outstanding at 
the time the initial notice of appeal was filed must file an 
amended notice of appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).  No 
amended notice was filed.  We note, however, that the parties to 
this appeal do not contest the amount of the judgment or the 
imposition of interest.  Thus, the sole issue before us is 
Greenberg's liability for withholding tax.  This was definitively 
decided by the district court's initial order. 
  
of their employees.  26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3102, 3401 (West Supp. 1994).  
The taxes withheld constitute a special fund held "in trust" for 
the benefit of the United States.  26 U.S.C.A. § 7501(a) (West 
1989).  Section 6672 of the Code imposes a penalty on certain 
persons for failure to turn over withholding taxes to the IRS.  
26 U.S.C.A. § 6672(a) (West Supp. 1994).  Specifically, it 
provides: 
 Any person required to collect, truthfully 
account for, and pay over any tax imposed by 
this title who willfully fails to collect 
such tax, or truthfully account for and pay 
over such tax, or willfully attempts in any 
manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the 
payment thereof, shall, in addition to other 
penalties provided by law, be liable to a 
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax 
evaded, or not collected, or not accounted 
for and paid over. . . . 
 
 
Id. 
 There are two conditions before liability can be 
imposed under section 6672:  first, the individual must be a 
"responsible person," and second, his or her failure to pay the 
tax must be "willful."  See Carrigan, 31 F.3d at 133; Brounstein 
v. United States, 979 F.2d 952, 954 (3d Cir. 1992).  If an 
individual's conduct fails to meet either condition, the IRS may 
not assess a section 6672 penalty against him.  With this in 
mind, we consider whether the district court correctly concluded 
that Greenberg was a responsible person who acted willfully when 
he failed to pay over Turning Basin's withholding taxes. 
 
  
 A.  Responsible Person Under Section 6672  
 For purposes of section 6672, a "person" is defined as 
"an officer or employee of a corporation . . . under a duty to 
perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs."  26 
U.S.C.A. § 6671(b) (West 1989).  Anyone falling within this 
definition is generally referred to as a "responsible person."  
Stated another way, a responsible person, for purposes of section 
6672(a), is one who is "required to collect, truthfully account 
for or pay over any tax due to the United States."  Carrigan, 31 
F.3d at 133 (citing Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 954). 
 "'Responsibility is a matter of status, duty, or 
authority, not knowledge.'  While a responsible person must have 
significant control over the corporation's finances, exclusive 
control is not necessary."  Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 954 (citation 
omitted) (quoting Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. IRS, 895 F.2d 
921, 927 (3d Cir. 1990)).  In determining whether an individual 
is a person responsible for paying over withholding taxes, courts 
consider the following factors: 
 (1) contents of the corporate bylaws, (2) 
ability to sign checks on the company's bank 
account, (3) signature on the employer's 
federal quarterly and other tax returns, (4) 
payment of other creditors in lieu of the 
United States, (5) identity of officers, 
directors, and principal stockholders in the 
firm, (6) identity of individuals in charge 
of hiring and discharging employees, and (7) 
identity of individuals in charge of the 
firm's financial affairs. 
 
 
Id. at 954-55.  It is not necessary that an individual have the 
final word on which creditors should be paid in order to be 
  
subject to liability under section 6672; a person may be treated 
as "responsible" for purposes of the statute if he has 
significant control over the disbursement of corporate funds.  
United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1332 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 The case before us is clearly distinguishable from the 
facts involved in Carrigan.  There, we held the United States was 
not entitled to summary judgment on its claim of section 6672 
liability because there was evidence that the taxpayer was not a 
"responsible person."  In Carrigan, the taxpayer was not 
responsible for handling the financial affairs of the company, 
nor did he prepare, maintain or have access to any of the 
corporate books, records or checkbooks.  Furthermore, the 
taxpayer in Carrigan did not handle any creditors' bills nor 
negotiate with any creditor on behalf of the company.  See 
Carrigan, 31 F.3d at 133-34. 
 In contrast, Greenberg was an authorized signatory on 
all of Turning Basin's corporate checking accounts and had 
unrestricted access to them at all times.  This record clearly 
shows that Greenberg used this power and signed most of the 
payroll checks issued during his tenure at Turning Basin, as well 
as checks written to a variety of other creditors, including the 
United States.  Greenberg was also an officer of the Company, a 
member of its Board of Directors and a minority shareholder. 
 Greenberg was aware of the employment tax delinquency 
as soon as it arose.  He wrote checks to pay other creditors 
while knowing that withholding tax liabilities to the United 
  
States remained unpaid.2  As controller of Turning Basin, 
Greenberg was in charge of the accounting department and 
supervised the reconciliation of checking account statements.  He 
also completed various tax forms.  Furthermore, Greenberg 
reviewed Turning Point's accounts payable with Tuchinsky, 
assisted Tuchinsky in determining which creditors should be paid 
and signed checks to pay creditors and meet payroll.  According 
to Greenberg's own testimony, he and Tuchinsky discussed which 
creditors needed to be paid most urgently, i.e., which creditors 
were threatening to cut off crucial services or supplies, and 
then decided who to pay.  Finally, Greenberg played a role in the 
hiring and firing of employees. 
 Our conclusion that Greenberg is a responsible person 
for purposes of section 6672 is supported by all of the evidence.  
The fact that Greenberg was instructed by Tuchinsky to pay 
creditors other than the United States despite the existence of 
withholding tax delinquencies and the fact Greenberg feared for 
his job were he to independently issue a check for the 
delinquency do not negate his status as a responsible person.  
                     
2
.  The dissent argues that Greenberg's check-writing function 
was merely ministerial, and that any checks Greenberg wrote were 
"worthless unless and until Tuchinsky deposited money into the 
checking account to cover them."  See infra, typescript at 3, 
lines 12-16.  The record shows that Greenberg wrote checks to 
other creditors and they were successfully negotiated.  Instead 
of issuing these checks, Greenberg could have chosen to write 
checks to the United States.  We recognize that the record also 
contains evidence tending to show that Greenberg would have lost 
his job when Tuchinsky discovered he had paid IRS but, as the 
dissent acknowledges, the threat that a person will be fired if 
he pays withholding taxes does not excuse a responsible person 
from the obligation to pay IRS. 
  
"Instructions from a superior not to pay taxes do not . . . take 
a person otherwise responsible under section 6672(a) out of that 
category."  Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 955 (citing Gephart v. United 
States, 818 F.2d 469, 474-75 (6th Cir. 1987); Roth v. United 
States, 779 F.2d 1567, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1986); Howard v. United 
States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir. 1983)).  We agree with the 
district court that this record does not leave any material 
questions of fact on Greenberg's responsibility for paying 
Turning Point's withholding taxes under section 6672. 
 
 B.  Willfulness Under Section 6672 
 The fact that Greenberg is a responsible person does 
not end our inquiry because IRS may impose section 6672 liability 
only if a responsible person "willfully" fails to collect, 
account for or pay over the withheld taxes.  26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6672(a).  We have stated, "[u]nder section 6672(a), willfulness 
is 'a voluntary, conscious and intentional decision to prefer 
other creditors over the Government.'  A responsible person acts 
willfully when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS 
knowing that taxes are due, or with reckless disregard for 
whether taxes have been paid."  Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 955-56 
(citations omitted) (quoting Quattrone, 895 F.2d at 928).  In 
order for the failure to turn over withholding taxes to be 
willful, a responsible person need only know that the taxes are 
due or act in reckless disregard of this fact when he fails to 
remit to IRS.  "Reckless disregard includes failure to 
investigate or correct mismanagement after being notified that 
  
withholding taxes have not been paid."  Morgan v. United States, 
937 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also Vespe, 
868 F.2d at 1335.  The taxpayer need not act with an evil motive 
or bad purpose for his action or inaction to be willful.  
Hochstein v. United States, 900 F.2d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 1990).  
Any payment to other creditors, including the payment of net 
wages to the corporation's employees, with knowledge that the 
employment taxes are due and owing to the Government, constitutes 
a willful failure to pay taxes.  See Datlof v. United States, 252 
F. Supp. 11, 32-33 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967). 
 Thus, Greenberg's failure to pay the withholding taxes 
Turning Basin owed IRS is willful if he paid other creditors, 
including employees, knowing that the withholding taxes were due.  
It is no defense that the corporation was in financial distress 
and that funds were spent to keep the corporation in business 
with an expectation that sufficient revenue would later become 
available to pay the United States.  See Emshwiller v. United 
States, 565 F.2d 1042, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 1977); Hochstein, 900 
F.2d at 548-49.  It is also not a defense that a taxpayer would 
lose his job if he signed a check to the IRS without the express 
authority of a superior.  Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 956; accord 
Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(responsible persons' failure to ensure payment of withholding 
taxes where chief executive officer ordered him not to pay taxes 
still willful for purposes of section 6672).  Finally, the 
assurance by another that the taxes will be taken care of is not 
  
a defense to liability under section 6672.  See Denbo v. United 
States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 Like the taxpayers in Brounstein and Vespe, this record 
clearly demonstrates Greenberg's knowledge that Turning Basin had 
not paid withholding taxes due IRS when he was signing checks to 
Turning Basin's employees and other creditors.  See Brounstein, 
979 F.2d at 956; Vespe, 868 F.2d at 1335.  Greenberg does not 
contend that he was unaware of the outstanding tax liability, nor 
does he dispute that he wrote checks to other creditors despite 
his knowledge of the outstanding tax liability.  The record 
clearly demonstrates that Greenberg acted willfully in failing to 
ensure payment of the withholding taxes to the IRS.  As a 
responsible person, he therefore exposed himself to liability 
under section 6672.  Thus, the district court did not err when it 
granted summary judgment in favor of the United States and 
against Greenberg on both Greenberg's complaint and the United 
States' counterclaim. 
 
  IV.  Conclusion 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
district court. 
 
                                    
 
 
Greenberg v. U.S., et al, No. 94-7075 
 
  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 26 U.S.C. § 6672 provides that a person responsible for 
withholding and paying over taxes who willfully fails to do so is 
liable for a penalty equal to the total amount of the unpaid 
taxes.  Because I think the facts of this case do not establish 
Greenberg's responsibility as a matter of law, I would reverse 
the summary judgment of the district court.  Hence, I dissent. 
 Responsibility under section 6672 "is a matter of 
status, duty or authority, not knowledge."  Quattrone 
Accountants, Inc. v. IRS, 895 F.2d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 1990).  A 
person is responsible within the meaning of section 6672 "if the 
person has significant, though not necessarily exclusive, control 
over the employer's finances."  Quattrone Accountants, 895 F.2d 
at 927.  "Significant control" means "the final or significant 
word over which bills or creditors get paid."  Id.; see Gephart 
v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that 
the test for responsibility focuses on "the degree of influence 
and control which the person exercised over the financial affairs 
of the corporation and, specifically, disbursements of funds and 
the priority of payments to creditors."); Godfrey v. United 
States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (defining 
responsibility in terms of a person's "power to compel or 
prohibit the allocation of corporate funds.").  Thus, in 
Quattrone Accountants, we found an accounting firm to be a 
responsible person because it 
  
 paid UDF's [the employer's] monthly bills 
without prior approval.  Consistent with this 
authority, [it] had possession of signature 
stamps of the treasurer and president of UDF.  
The only limitation on this authority was 
that each month [it] had to present to the 
Board of UDF the bills it had paid for the 
previous month. . . . 
Quattrone Accountants, 895 F.2d at 927.  Factors we have looked 
to in determining whether a person has significant control over 
an employer's finances include: 
 (1) that person's duties under the employer's 
corporate bylaws; (2) his or her ability to 
sign checks on the employer's bank account; 
(3) the signature on the employer's federal 
quarterly and other tax returns; (4) the 
payment of other creditors in lieu of the 
United States; (5) the identity of the 
officers, directors and principal 
stockholders of the employer; (6) the 
identity of the individuals in charge of 
hiring and firing employees; and (7) the 
identity of the individuals in charge of the 
employer's financial affairs. 
 
Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 955. 
 The district court held that Greenberg was a 
responsible person as a matter of law.  It correctly noted that 
the definition of "responsible person" is not limited to the 
person with the final say on which bills get paid, but includes 
others as well.  See Quattrone, 895 F.2d at 927; see also Vespe, 
868 F.2d at 1332 ("More than one individual may be a responsible 
[pe]rson for a given employer.").  The district court concluded, 
primarily from Greenberg's authority to sign checks, that he had 
such "significant say."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 10. 
  
 I disagree that Greenberg's responsibility was 
established here as a matter of law.  I think that the district 
court placed too much reliance on Greenberg's check-writing role.  
That is one factor, relevant to the question of responsibility, 
but not the only one.  See Godfrey, 748 F.2d at 1575 ("The 
mechanical duties of signing checks and preparing tax returns are 
. . . not determinative of liability under § 6672.").  The reason 
that check-writing ability is often significant is "because it 
generally comes with the ability to choose which creditors will 
be paid."  Burack v. United States, 461 F.2d 1282,      (Ct. Cl. 
1972).  Here, however, it may not have.  Greenberg has offered 
evidence that his check-writing functions were merely 
ministerial, done at Tuchinsky's behest and requiring his prior 
approval, and that, although Greenberg could write the checks, 
they were worthless unless and until Tuchinsky deposited money 
into the checking account to cover them.   
 The government does not dispute this evidence; it 
simply points to the other indicia of Greenberg's status.  I 
think that this makes Greenberg's responsibility a question for 
the jury.  The issue is "for the trier of fact to determine, upon 
all the evidence, taking into account questions of credibility 
and those reasonable inferences flowing from the evidence which 
may establish, or fail to establish, that [Greenberg] possessed a 
sufficient degree of authority over corporate decisionmaking so 
as to make him a responsible person within section 6672. . . ."  
Jay v. United States, 865 F.2d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 1989). 
  
 The district court reasoned that a finding of 
responsibility was dictated by Brounstein.  I disagree.  
Brounstein was not only the treasurer of the company (like 
Greenberg), but also was president and under the corporate bylaws 
had the authority to exercise managerial control.  Brounstein, 
979 F.2d at 955.  Additionally, although most of the checks 
Brounstein wrote for the company were at the direction of its 
principal, he also (unlike Greenberg) issued checks without the 
principal's approval.  Id. 
 We did say in Brounstein that "[i]instructions from a 
superior not to pay taxes do not, however, take a person 
otherwise responsible under section 6672(a) out of that 
category[]," id. at 955 (emphasis added).  That, however, does 
not foreclose the possibility that Greenberg might not be 
responsible in the first place.  The government's reliance on 
Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1983) and other 
courts of appeals cases following Howard3 is, for the same 
reason, misplaced.  In Howard, the Fifth Circuit stated: 
 The fact that Jennings [Howard's superior] 
might well have fired Howard had he disobeyed 
Jennings' instructions and paid the taxes 
does not make Howard any less responsible for 
their payment.  Howard had the status, duty 
and authority to pay the taxes owed, and 
would only have lost that authority after he 
had paid them.  Authority to pay in this 
context means effective power to pay.  That 
Howard had that authority is demonstrated by 
the fact that he did issue small checks 
                     
3
.  Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1987); Roth 
v. United States, 779 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986). 
  
without Jennings' approval on a number of 
occasions. . . . 
Id. at 734 (citations omitted).  These cases simply say that, if 
a person is responsible, a superior's instructions not to pay the  
